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Research on highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) H5N1 has gained much 
attention in recent years due to its devastating impact within the bird population. 
While transmission to humans is rare, infections are fatal in more than half of the 
cases. One of the main concerns among the scientific community is the ability for this 
virus to mutate in a way much like seasonal influeanza that would allow it to be 
transmitted efficiently among the human population. Two researchers were able to 
separately create mutant isolates of H5N1 influenza A virus that could be transmitted 
via the respiratory route between ferrets. The submission of these articles led to 
multiple public health and biosecurity/biosafety concerns. The purpose of this paper 
is to explore the current debate regarding restrictions on H5N1 research. H5N1is a 
great risk to biosecurity/biosafety, and many believe it should be excluded from 
future research. However, with the viruses’ high mutation rate and the possibility of 
genetic reassortment with other mammalian influenza viruses the risks to society are 
already high. Since the virus could become a pandemic within the human population, 
this paper will also provide an in depth exploration of current public health policy and 
pandemic preparedness operations underway. 
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 Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 is a bird-adapted 
strain that has reached enzootic status in many bird populations, especially 
in Southeast Asia where it is responsible for the death of millions of birds 
annually. HPAI H5N1 is considered an avian disease, although there is some 
evidence of transmission from infected birds to humans. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) data indicate that since 2003, HPAI H5N1 viruses 
have infected 603 people, with 356 of those infections resulting in mortality 
(1). Influenza A viruses circulating among poultry have the potential to 
recombine with human influenza A viruses and become more transmissible 
among humans. Therefore there is great concern that this virus may acquire 
the ability to be transmitted via respiratory droplets amongst humans, 
resulting in a future pandemic. Dr. David Nabarro, Chief Avian Flu 
Coordinator for the United Nations, and former Chief of Crisis Response for 
the World Health Organization, has estimated that the avian flu could kill up 
to 150 million people, comparing the potential impact of the virus to AIDS 
in Africa (2).  
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 H5N1’s high mortality rate and the possibility that it could mutate to 
become transmissible to humans make it a high priority research topic for 
public health preparedness and pandemic prevention efforts. Because HPAI 
H5N1 viruses are always changing, the CDC and other public health 
agencies look for genetic changes in HPAI H5N1 viruses that may impact 
how HPAI H5N1 viruses spread from person to person or  their 
susceptibility to influenza antiviral drugs (1).  Billions of U.S. dollars are 
spent to research H5N1 and prepare for a potential avian influenza 
pandemic. However, important scientific and public health questions 
regarding H5N1 remain unanswered, particularly the likelihood of such 
mutations arising and the mechanisms by which they may occur (1). In an 
attempt to explore this concern, two studies identified several mechanisms 
by which the virus might evolve to transmit efficiently in the ferret (1). 
Stemming from these transmission experiments came a need for policy to 
regulate biosecurity/biosafety hazards to prevent the accidental or potential 
release of this laboratory virus. Many argue that the risks of this research 
outweigh the benefits (18). However, with this virus already circulating in 
nature and constantly mutating, a credible threat already exists.  
 With the identification of genetic pathways by which H5N1 can better 
adapt to transmission among humans there is a great concern for public 
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health. With this sort of a crisis lurking around the corner there is urgency 
for policy analysis at both public and private levels.  Exhaustive efforts were 
done to control the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and with and a new pandemic 
potentially on the rise it will be important to implement both old and new 
public health policies such as prevention strategies, educational outreach, 
and vaccination (21) . Because HPAI H5N1 at the moment is not directly 
affecting the U.S., little is openly discussed as far as preparation for the 
future. This paper will discuss the HPAI H5N1 virus as a risk factor to 
human health, while also providing a detailed analysis of what is and can be 





Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) 
Influenza A viruses are enveloped RNA viruses with an eight-segmented, single-
stranded, negative-sense genome belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Aquatic 
birds are the natural hosts of type A influenza viruses (2). Occasionally, these viruses 
cross from aquatic wild birds to poultry or mammals, and new genotypes of the virus 
become established within the new host. Of the influenza viruses that cross to terrestrial 
poultry, one of the most important is the H5 subtype.  Highly pathogenic Influenza A 
H5N1 viruses – also called “HPAI H5N1 virus”, is an influenza virus that occurs mainly 
within the bird population.  The virus spreads rapidly through flocks of poultry, causing 
disease that affects multiple internal organs with a high fatality occurrence that can often 
reach 90 to 100% (2).  In recent years H5N1 has reached epizootic and panzootic status, 
killing  millions of birds (2). The HPAI H5N1 virus does not usually infect humans, but 
infections with the virus have been known to occur. 
As seen in figure 1, eight gene segments of influenza A virus encode 10 proteins: 
hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), matrix proteins M2 and M1, nonstructural 
(NS) proteins NS1 and NS2, the nucleocapsid, and the three polymerases, the PB1 
(polymerase basic 1), PB2 (polymerase basic 2), and PA (polymerase acidic) proteins. 
The segmented genome of influenza viruses allows for genetic reassortment to occur 
when two influenza viruses infect the same cell (3). This provides influenza viruses with 
the ability to generate genetic diversity to permit interspecies transmission and to evade 
host immune responses through a major antigenic change, as will be discussed later (3). 
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Viral Genes and Proteins  
1. Hemagglutinin 
Hemagglutinin (HA) is a glycosylated type I integral membrane protein that 
functions in both receptor binding and cell fusion events. The globular head portion 
mediates the attachment of the virus to host cells while the stem portion mediates the 
fusion of the viral membrane to the host cell membrane, allowing the viral genome to 
infect host cells. The HA protein binds to sialic acid -containing receptors expressed on 
the surface of host cells (4). After proteolytic activation of the precursor HA molecule 
into HA1 and HA2 the virus is able to fuse with the host cell, as can be seen in figure 2 
(4). Once HA has bound to its receptor, the virus is able to enter the cell via receptor 
mediated endocytosis. With the virus now internalized, the low pH of the endosome 
allows a conformational change in the HA protein exposing the fusion peptide that 
functions to fuse the viral envelope and the cell membrane. After membrane fusion, the 
ribonucleoprotein particles vRNPs are released into the cytoplasm and traffic towards the 




Figure 1. Representation of the Influenza A Viral Genome.  
The enveloped RNA virus with its eight-segmented single stranded genome 
can be seen, along with the 10 viral protein products which are depicted as they are 
naturally associated within the virus. 
Adapted from [5] 
 
 
Figure 2. Representation of the HA Protein in its Monomeric Form. 
 
The cleavage site, known to be associated with HPAI virulence can be seen in 
green. HA1 and HA2 can be seen in blue and red. Post cleavage HA1 and HA2 will 
represent the dimeric form of the protein that will later allow the virus to fuse with 
its associated receptor. Within HA2, the transmembrane portion to be embedded 
within the vial envelope can be seen in orange. 
Adapted from [5] 
 
2. Neuraminidase  
The neuraminidase (NA) protein is a type II integral membrane glycoprotein that 
functions as a sialidase. It functions in cleaving the HA of progeny virions from the sialic 
acid receptors, facilitating virus release from infected cells (4). The NA protein 
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additionally helps viral spread by also removing sialic acids from the cell surface (4). 
These cleavages prevent self-aggregation that would otherwise limit the infection to one 
round of replication.  NA is inhibited by the antiviral neuraminidase inhibitors zanamivir 
and oseltamivir which interfere with the release of progeny virus from infected cells (4). 
Currently, the most prevalent strain of H5N1 has not adapted resistance and is still 
vulnerable to these drugs (4).   
3. Polymerase Gene Complex and Nucleocapsid Protein 
The polymerase complex is composed of three viral polymerase proteins: 
polymerase basic proteins 1 and 2 (PB1 and PB2) and polymerase acidic protein (PA) 
involved in viral RNA synthesis (4). PB1 functions as an RNA- dependent RNA 
polymerase, while PB2 is required for mRNA synthesis by binding and cleaving host 5’ 
mRNA  methyl caps (5). The PA protein has essential roles in the synthesis of both 
genomic and messenger RNA. The Nucleoprotein (NP) encloses all of the viral RNA 
gene segments and primarily serves as the structural protein of vRNPs. The NP is also 
involved in transcription by stabilizing template polymerase interactions and in 
intracellular trafficking of vRNPs  (5).  
4. M1 and M2 Proteins 
The M gene encodes two proteins, matrix protein 1 (M1) and matrix protein 2 
(M2), which are alternative splice products. M1 interacts with both surface glycoproteins 
and vRNPs and promotes assembly and budding (5). The M2 protein is a type III integral 
membrane protein that functions as a H+ ion channel, controlling the pH in the Golgi 
complex during HA synthesis and virion disassembly (4).  
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5. Nonstructural Proteins 
The nonstructural proteins (NS1 and NS2) are also alternative splice products 
from the same gene segment, both having important roles in viral replication.  NS1 has 
various functions within the viral replication cycle, including viral RNA replication, viral 
protein synthesis, and general host-cell physiology. It has also been known to inhibit host 
immune response, by decreasing production of interferon (IFN) and the antiviral effects 
of IFN-induced proteins, such as dsRNA-dependent protein kinease R (PKR) and 2’5’-
oligoadenylate synthetase (OAS)/RNase L (5).  The NS2 protein, also referred to as 
nuclear export protein (NEP), facilitates the nuclear export of vRNP complexes to the 
assembly site at the apical cell membrane (5).  
Human Pathogenesis of HPAI H5N1 
As can be seen in Figure 3, a combination of factors play a role in the 
pathogenesis of H5N1 (4). Similar to other human influenza infections H5N1 viral 
replication results in cell and organ damage via cytolytic and/or apoptotic mechanisms 
(4). Virus replication occurs mainly in the respiratory tract, allowing the virus to be 
isolated from throat and trachea aspiratates, postmortem lung tissues, and viral RNA from 
nasal, nasopharyngeal, and tracheal specimens (4). Animal experiments have also shown 
human H5N1 isolates to be found in extra-pulmonary organs such as the intestines, brain 
and placenta.  
The so called “cytokine storm” is thought to be one of the largest contributors to 
the pathogenesis of H5N1. H5N1 patients commonly show elevated serum levels of 
proinflammatory cytokines and chemokines (4). Immunohistochemistry analysis of the 
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lung from H5N1 autopsy cases has detected high expression levels of tumor necrosis 
factor-α (TNF-α), macrophage inflammatory protein -1 α, regulated on activation normal 
T cell expressed and secreted (RANTES), interferon-γ (IFN-γ), interferon-β (IFN-β), and 
interleukin-6 (IL-6)(4). 
TNF-related apoptosis-inducing ligand (TRAIL) has been shown to be 
upregulated in macrophages infected with H5N1. This ligand binds to a death receptor 
present on a target cell, ultimately leading to cell death via apoptosis. Research 
comparing T lymphocytes apoptosis induction in the presence of macrophages infected 
with H5N1 or other influenza viruses showed that H5N1 infected macrophages can 
increase induction of apoptosis (4). These macrophages also displayed a delayed onset of 
apoptosis themselves, resulting in further T lymphocyte apoptosis and extended 
cytokine/chemokine synthesis (4). H5N1 induced apoptosis has also been seen in alveolar 
epithelial cells, leukocytes in the lungs, spleen, and intestinal tissues, therefore resulting 
in further injury of these organs, possibly through viral replication and/or up regulation of 
cytokines and chemokines.  The HA of the H5N1 virus has also been shown in vitro to 
suppress the expression of cytotoxic perforin in CD8+ cytotoxic T lymphocytes (4). This 
impairment of cytotoxic T cells results in decreased lysis of infected target cells enabling 






Figure 3. Human Pathogenesis of H5N1 
  Diagram depicting the key pathogenic mechanisms, viral genes, and gene 
products that may be involved in H5N1 influenza virus infection.man Pathogenesis 
of H5N1 
Adapted from [4] 
Virulence of HPAI H5N1 
Several viral genes and proteins contribute to the virulence of all influenza 
viruses. Differences in these proteins contribute to the high pathogenic state of H5N1. 
The cleavability of the HA protein and the distribution of HA-activating proteases in the 
host are the major virulence factors of H5N1.  Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) 
viruses have a single arginine residue at the cleavage site that can only be cleaved by 
proteases in the upper respiratory tract and gastrointestinal tract leading to local 
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infections (4). HPAI has multiple basic residues at the cleavage site that can be activated 
by intracellular proteases such as Furin and PC6, and therefor can cause systemic 
infections (4).   
The NS1 protein is also believed to be responsible for the enhanced virulence of 
the strain. A single amino acid substitution of serine for proline significantly increases the 
virulence of the virus strain (6). This substitution gives the virus an enhanced ability to 
antagonize the host IFN response while also preventing the dsRNA-mediated activation 
of the NF-kB pathway and the IRF-3 pathway (6). This would allow the virus to block 
any cell mediated transcription in an effort to promote single stranded viral mediated 
transcription.  
Using microarray analysis and quantitative RT-PCR, researchers were able to 
show a decreased expression of pulmonary surfactant protein (SP-D) in the lungs from 
two fatal cases of an H5N1 infection (7). SP-D’s main function during an infection is to 
bind lectins on the surface of the pathogen and opsonize them for phagocytosis. 
However, research has shown that H5N1 is significantly less glycosylated than seasonal 
strains of influenza and therefore resistant to the effects of SP-D (7).  
III. H5N1 A THREAT TO HUMANS  
Risk of Human Transmissibility  
In its present form the H5N1 virus can only be transmitted to humans through 
contact with secretions and excretions from an infected bird, such as saliva, nasal 
secretions and feces. The World Health Organization (WHO) data indicate that since 
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2003, HPAI H5N1 viruses have infected 603 people, with 356 of those infections 
resulting in mortality (1). These human infections cases may be a result of unusually high 
dose exposure to the virus, stemming from close contact with diseased poultry or rare 
individual susceptibilities.  Alternatively, HPAI H5N1 viruses could be adapting to a 
human host.  
There is great concern that this virus may acquire the ability to be transmitted via 
respiratory droplets among humans, therefore resulting in a future pandemic. One of the 
major host range determinants of any strain of influenza virus is the affinity of the viral 
HA protein for its host cell’s sialic acid receptor. Avian influenza viruses bind to alpha-2, 
3 sialic acid receptors, while human influenza viruses bind to the alpha-2, 6 isoform.  
Ferrets are used in influenza research because they are susceptible to infection with 
human and avian influenza viruses. Their receptor distribution resembles that of humans 
since they have alpha-2, 6 linked SA receptors present in the upper respiratory tract, with 
alpha-2, 3 linked SA receptors mainly present in the lower respiratory tract. While avian 
viruses replicate at temperatures around 41°C, for replication in a human host the virus 
must adapt to an internal temperature of 33°C (8).  For H5N1 the amino acid substitution 
GLU627-LYS629 (E627K) in the polymerase complex protein (PB2) has been associated 
with increased viral replication in mammalian cells at lower temperatures (8).  Another 
factor that the virus would need to overcome has to do with the NA protein that facilitates 
the release of virus particles from a previously infected cell. For H5N1 this process often 
results in the released viral particles forming aggregates with other viral progeny and 
therefore inhibiting their ability to infect other host cells (8). 
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  Avian influenza has several mechanisms to overcome the H5N1 host 
transmission barrier. Due to the low fidelity RNA-dependent RNA polymerase, avian 
influenza viruses have a high mutation rate from 1x10-3 to 8x10-3 substitutions per site 
per year (5). This mechanism of mutation is referred to as antigenic drift (Figure 4 A). 
Mutations that alter amino acids found in antigenic regions of the HA and NA are likely 
to confer selective advantages via evasion of pre-existing immunity. Because the majority 
of the human population has never been exposed to H5N1 and therefore has not acquired 
prior immunity, this method largely results in seasonal epidemics and is not usually the 
cause of a pandemic virus emergence. The viruses that caused the major pandemics in the 
past emerged from reassortment of animal and human influenza viruses, such as the 2009 
H1N1virus. In this process known as antigenic shift an entire gene segment is exchanged 
(Figure 4 B).  If a cell is infected with two different influenza viruses, it is possible that 
when the new virus particles are assembled at the plasma membrane, they could contain 









Figure 4. Antigenic Shift vs. Antigenic Drift 
In figure A antigenic drift is represented as a function of time. Over time 
mutational changes occur that allow the virus certain selective advantages. Figure B 
represent s antigenic shift which occurs via co-infection with two different parent 
strains of influenza virus, resulting in a reassortment strain that is highly adaptable 
to new environments. 
Adapted from [5] 
 
This process of genetic reassortment is how one group of researchers was able to 
show respiratory transmission of the virus in ferrets. In order to study transmission ability 
the authors generated a virus containing the HA from an H5N1 virus and the seven 
remaining gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (H5HA/pdm09)(9). Using 
receptor binding studies and animal experiments, they were able to identify a derivative 
of the reassortment virus. This virus (H5HA-mutant/pdm09) possessed four mutations in 
its HA protein (N158D,Q226L,N224K, and  T138I) that enabled it to recognize sialic 





Figure 5. H5HA-mutant/pdm09 HA Mutations 
A model of the H5N1 influenza virus and its HA protein possessing four 
mutations. These four single site insertion mutations (Q226L, N224K, N158D, and 
T318I), acquired by antigentic drifting, allowed the virus to change its receptor 
specificity from alpha 2,3-sialic acid receptors to the human alpha 2,6-isoform. 
Adapted from [9] 
Using an experimental setting that allowed the exchange of the virus between 
ferrets to occur only via respiratory droplets, the authors were able to show mutant virus 
(H5HA-mutant/pdm09) transmission. Naïve ferrets were placed in wireframe cages next 
to ferrets inoculated with 10*6
th
 plaque forming unit of virus. In this manner all 
transmission stemming from direct or indirect contact was prevented. Similar to previous 
transmission experiments, a pdm09 virus was efficiently transmitted via respiratory 
droplets to all three contact ferrets, as evidenced by the detection of virus in nasal washes  
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in these animals ( Figure 6)(9). As expected because of the lack of HA mutations, the 
H5HA/pdm09 virus was not transmitted (Figure 6). However, in the H5HA-
mutant/pdm09-inoculated group, virus was recovered from 4 of the 6 contact ferrets 
between days 3 and 7 post-contact (Figure 6)(9). Moreover, seroconversion was detected 
in all six animals (9). 
 
 
Figure 6. Respiratory Droplet Transmission of H5 Avian-Human Reassortmant 
viruses in ferrets. 
Groups of three or six ferrets were inoculated intranasally with 10*6th PFU 
of pdm09 positive control (a), H5HA/pdm09 negative control (b), or H5HA-
mutant/pdm09 (c). After one day post infection, naïve ferrets were placed in 
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adjacent cages, with nasal washes being collected every other day from inoculated 
(left panel) and contact (right panel) ferrets for the purpose of virus titration. 
Adapted from [9] 
 
To ensure that the H5HA-mutant/pdm09 virus could bind specifically to a human 
type receptor, sections of human tracheal and lung tissues were exposed to viruses 
containing a human virus HA, a wildtype H5 HA which should bind exclusively to  2,3 
siliac acid avian receptors, and the H5HA-mutant/pdm09 virus (9). As can be seen in 
figure 7, all viruses bound to the alveolar epithelial surface since this lung tissue contains 
both human and avian type receptors. However, within the tracheal epithelia where 
predominantly human type receptors are located, only the human virus HA and the 
mutant H5HA were bound (Figure 7)(9).  This suggesting recognition of human type 





Figure 7. H5HA-mutant/pdm09 Virus Bound to Human Type Receptor  
Human H1N1, wild-type H5, and mutant H5HA viruses were incubated with 
human trachea and alveoli tissue sections and then stained with the appropriate 
antibody to demonstrate receptor specificity. Nuclei are represented in blue 
(Hoechst dye) while virus binding can be seen in green (fluorescent-labeled 
secondary antibodies). Receptor binding can be seen with all viruses within the 
alveoli tissue which contains both alpha 2, 3 siliac and 2, 6 siliac acid receptors. The 
mutant H5HA virus was able to successfully bind to alpha 2, 6 siliac acid receptors 
within the human tracheal tissue, indicating receptor adaptation. 
Adapted from [9] 
Since the mutant virus contains seven segments from a human H1N1 virus there 
are several other factors that may have contributed to the mutant viruses’ successful 
transmission. As previously mentioned, one example of this includes amino acids in the 
PB2 polymerase protein that allow for lower temperature replication. This specific 
sequence of amino acids allows for efficient replication in mammalian, but not avian cells 
(9). Most avian influenza virus PB2 proteins lack these amino acids and therefore lack 
the ability to replicate within mammalian cells. However, the change, of a glutamic acid 
to lysine mutation at position 627has been found in H5N1 viruses circulating in the 
Middle East (10). Another study was able to show that a human virus NA gene was 
necessary to allow transmissibility to a mutant H5 avian-human reassortmant virus (11).  
In this study, four amino acid substitutions (S227N, D187G, E190G, and Q196R) were 
found within the H5N1 virus head domain (11). The mutant virus proved to be 
transmissible among ferrets through direct contact, however it was not susceptible to 
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respiratory transmission. Using a reassortant virus with the mutant HA, a human N2 and 
internal genes from an H5N1 the virus was transmitted via respiratory droplets (11).  
Therefore the mutant H5 HA recognizing human alpha 2, 6 receptors may not be the sole 
contributor to mammalian transmissibility of the virus.  
 The three influenza pandemics in the past 80 years have all evolved from 
reassortments of preexisting human/mammalian adapted viruses with genes of an avian 
influenza virus. No purely avian influenza virus has acquired the ability to infect humans 
through adaptation or mutation, causing a pandemic outbreak (1). However, avian 
influenza viruses have been able to adapt to other mammals so we cannot rule out their 
ability to adapt to a human host. It has been proposed that the 1918 H1N1 virus was not a 
reassortant virus, but an entirely avian-like virus that adapted to humans (35). Ten amino 
acid changes in the polymerase proteins differentiate the 1918 and subsequent human 
influenza viruses from avian virus sequences (35). Since we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a future pandemic could be triggered by a wholly avian virus without the 
requirement of reassortment, researchers investigated whether HPAI H5N1 could change 
its transmissibility characteristic without genetic reassortment. In order to do this a 
combination of targeted mutagenesis followed by serial virus passage in ferrets was done. 
The virus strain chosen was a complete A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus isolated from a human 
case of HPAI A/H5N1 infection. The authors had previously located several amino acid 
substitutions (N128K, Q22L/G224S, or N128K/Q22L/G224S) in the receptor binding site 
of the HA surface glycoprotein of A/Indonesia/2005 (8). These mutations efficiently 
changed the virus binding preference from the avian-2, 3-link SA receptors to the human 
 20 
 
alpha-2,6-linked SA receptors, providing them with a mutant virus to be used in future 
transmission based studies.  
The authors used multisite-directed mutagenesis to introduce these specific amino 
acid substitutions into a wildtype A/Indonesia/5/2005 virus, giving rise to the mutant 
A/H5N1 HA Q222L, G224S strain (8). This strain was proven to yield high virus titers in 
the ferret upper respiratory track (URT), and was further used in other experiments 
related to transmissibility. The amino acid substitution E627K in PB2 is an important 
host range determinant of all influenza viruses. The authors introduced this amino acid 
substitution into the mutant strain, giving rise to A/H5N1 Q222L, G224S PB2 E627K.  
When these mutations collectively did not allow transmission when tested amongst 
ferrets using the cage method  previously described, the authors then forced the virus to 
mutate on it’s on through serial passages that would allow the virus to adapt to replication 
within the mammalian respiratory tract (8). As the passage number increased up to 10 
serial passages the authors saw a continuous increase in virus titers in the nasal turbinates 
of ferrets inoculated with the mutant virus. As can be seen in Figure 8A these titers 
ranged from 1x10 ^4 TCID50/gram tissue at the start of the experiment to 3.2x10^5 to 
1x10^6 TCID50/gram tissue in the final passages (8).    Figure 8 B shows that ferrets 
inoculated with the mutant virus also showed an increase of viral titers within nose 
swabs, peaking at 1X10^5TCID50 (8). Collectively, data indicated that the mutant virus 





Figure 8. Ferret Nasal Turbinates and Nose Results during Serial Dilution 
(A)Virus titers in the nasal turbinates collected at day 4 from ferrets 
inoculated with A/H5N1 wildtype (blue) and A/H5N1 mutant (red) throughout 10 
serial passages.  (B) Virus titers in nose swabs collected daily until day 4 from 
ferrets inoculated with A/H5N1 wildtype (blue) and A/H5N1 mutant (red) 
throughout 10serial passages. As can be seen in both images mutant virus titers 
increased significantly during serial passages, indicating that a pattern of 
adaptation was being developed. 
Adapted from [8] 
To test airborne transmission nasal wash samples collected 3 days post infection 
(DPI) from wild type and mutant infected ferrets at passage 10 were used to inoculate six 
naïve ferrets intranasally (8). The next day a naïve recipient ferret was placed in a cage 
adjacent to an inoculated donor ferret through only which air flow was capable, as to 
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prevent any direct or indirect contact. Even though mutations had acquired within the 
A/H5N1 wildtype strain, airborne transmission of this virus did not occur (Figure 9A and 
B)(8). However, virus was detected in recipient ferrets paired with those inoculated with 
passage 10 mutant viruses, as can be seen in Figure 9 (8). Three out of four naïve 
recipient ferrets became infected as can be seen in figure 9 C and D with the presence of 
replicating virus in collected nasal and throat swabs (8). Transmission was further 
verified when virus obtained from a throat swab from recipient ferret 2 was used to again 
successfully infect two additional ferrets. This study was able to show that as few as five 
amino acid substitutions (four in the HA and one in PB2) may be sufficient to confer 
airborne transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus between mammals.   
 




Figure 9. Wildtype and mutant H5N1 Virus Airborne Ferret Transmission 
Results 
Transmission experiments for A/H5N1 wildtype (A) and (B) and 
A/H5N1 mutant (C) and (D) after 10 serial passages. Groups of ferrets were 
inoculated intranasally with nasal wash samples collected from P10 virus of 
both wildtype and mutant types and housed in transmission cages (A and C).  
A naïve recipient ferret was added to a cage adjacent to the transmission cage 
and transmission rates were measured via virus titer (B and D). Virus titers 
in throat (black bars) and nose swabs (white bars) 
Adapted from [8] 
Current Containment Level/Biosafety Considerations  
While research on H5N1viral transmission and vaccine development is critical, it 
is important to conduct such research using appropriate biocontainment and biosafety 
conditions. Currently, studies with mammalian transmissible H5N1 are being done at 
BSL3 or higher (12). However because of the 60% fatality ratio there is a push for virus 
to be moved into BSL4 facilities (2). According to Laboratory Biosafety Manual 
(BMBL) four questions must be considered when choosing a containment level. First, 
does the pathogen cause disease in healthy humans, animals, and plants (13)? Second, if 
so, how severe is the disease (13)? Third, how transmissible is the pathogen, and what is 
its primary route of transmission (13)? Fourth, are preventative vaccines and therapeutic 
antivirals available, and if so, how widely (13)? The main point of concern here is, does 
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making the H5N1 virus transmissible among mammals change its biosafety profile. To 
explore the issue one must begin with answering the questions listed above. H5N1 clearly 
causes disease in otherwise healthy humans and animals. The disease itself is severe, with 
a case fatality rate of approximately 60% (1).  As far as transmission, H5N1 is spread 
through a respiratory route, and is therefore categorized by the BMBL as a serious 
pathogen (13). While H5N1 is not currently transmissible among mammals, we must take 
the results of the previously discussed ferret studies in consideration, as the virus 
consistently evolves. Finally, the issue of treatment and prevention is to be considered. 
To date, a vaccine against H5N1 is not publicly available, ruling out the possibility of 
immunizing laboratory workers and the general public.  The virus has been shown to be 
sensitive to the antivirals zanamivir and oseltamivir (14). However, if there were an 
H5N1 pandemic, drug resistance would undoubtedly evolve.  Collectively these 
considerations lead to the push for BSL4 containment of the virus. 
While maintaining the virus at BSL4 conditions might seem to decrease biosafety 
and biosecurity concerns, ultimately it is doing just the opposite. Since BSL4 laboratories 
are not only very sparse in number but also engaged in research with other dangerous 
pathogens (12). To minimize the possible risk of accidental virus release into the 
environment, research should be conducted in a facility equipped with interlocked rooms 
with negative pressure and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtered air circulation 
and using appropriate decontamination and sterilization practices for any material 
exciting the facility (14). Since human infection with influenza occurs via the respiratory 
route, infection of laboratory workers can be prevented by the use of powered air-
purifying respirators (14). Flu scientist Adolfo Garcia-Sastre of the Mount Sinai School 
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of Medicine argues that BSL3 facilities offer the necessary security measures, such as 
interlocked rooms with negative pressure, air circulation systems, and adequate 
decontamination and sterilization practices (15). If H5N1 research would become 
restricted to BSL4 containment it would restrict research of viral transmission and 
vaccine development to few facilities while significantly decreasing the future knowledge 
of this pathogen.  
IV. Public Policy: A Public Health Response 
Dual use Research Policy 
In 2011 the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 
came to the conclusion that the benefits of H5N1 research did not outweigh the risks (17).  
Their concerns were stemmed from the two studies previously mentioned that were able 
to successfully create mutant strains of the H5N1virus that could be transmitted via the 
respiratory route between ferrets. The authors were asked to withhold several key 
methodologies used in their research (16). In a debate the World Health Organization 
(WHO) stated that open publication of the studies would only serve to benefit public 
health.  However, the NSABB brought up two significant issues that sealed the decision 
not to fully publish the articles. The first issue was based on the high human case-fatality 
rate and concerns of a future pandemic, while the second had to do with the ability of our 
current influenza vaccines and their ability to react against the mutated virus (17).  
Nevertheless, in April of 2012 due to a suggestion from the U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services (HHS), the NSABB recommended to permit full publication of the 
articles (17).   
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As a result of this debate the U.S. government instituted a policy to oversee 
research concerns that pose both beneficial and harmful concerns to society. The H5N1 
virus, along with many other viruses make up a category of dual-use research of concern 
pathogens (DURC), which this policy regulates. The new policy requires all research 
agencies to review both proposed projects and those already funded. If a review identifies 
DURC potential, the funding agency, the institution, and the lead scientist are instructed 
to develop a "risk mitigation plan” (18). This policy will include efforts to modify how 
the research is conducted, move it to a more secure laboratory, and communicate it to the 
public and other scientists responsibly.  For viruses such as H5N1 that raise a large risk to 
the human population, agencies will determine whether to release the content of their 
publications or withhold information to reduce public health and biosecurity risks (18).     
An Industrial Policy Perspective 
 The U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Department of Agriculture have 
adopted strict policies for monitoring bird health within the United States. The 
Interagency Strategic Plan for monitoring of wild birds has implemented the majority of 
their efforts within the state of Alaska. Within this plan local biologists sample live birds, 
hunter -taken birds, sentinel flocks, and the environment used by these targeted 
populations for HPAI H5N1(19).  Alaska serves as a crossroad for migratory birds that 
annually return from winter migration in Asia, and come in contact with other North 
American migratory birds that return to Alaska in the spring from wintering areas in the 
southern United States and Central America (19.). Migratory birds are also being tested 
by state and local agencies so that early detection of H5N1 may be forwarded to the 
agriculture, public health and wildlife communities.  The USDA and DOI plan to test 
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75,000 to 100,000 live and dead birds annually (19). Of these samples approximately 
11,000 will be initially screened by USGS at its National Wildlife Health Center in 
Madison, WI, with the remaining samples being tested at labs certified by USDA in the 
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (19). If any of these samples test positive 
for H5N1, they will automatically be sent to the USDA National Veterinary Services 
Laboratory in Ames, Iowa, for further diagnostic testing (19). U.S. domestic and wild 
bird populations also undergo enhanced monitoring regimes. The USDA monitors live 
bird markets, commercial flocks, backyard flock and migratory bird population (19).  
 The USDA also maintains strict trade restrictions on the importation of poultry 
and poultry products from countries such as Europe, Asia and Africa where H5N1 has 
been detected in commercial poultry (19). The USDA’s Animal Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) and Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service also work with the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection at major U.S. 
air and seaports to inspect and regulate the importation of live poultry, commercial birds, 
pet birds and hatching eggs (19). In order for live birds to be imported into the United 
States post examination, they are required to be quarantined for thirty days at a USDA 
quarantine facility and tested for H5N1, before entering the country (19).  
 Reaching an optimal level of disease control will require a combination of private 
and public activities. Poultry producers play a key role in implementing control measures 
to reduce the probability of HPAI infection. These individuals may unknowingly lack 
information on HPAI and appropriate disease prevention and control strategies. HPAI 
education is one way of improving awareness of the disease; clinical signs, infection 
prevention, and the importance of outbreak containment are all essential components of 
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this education (20). Another factor involved in controlling the spread of disease is 
surveillance of poultry operations to monitor birds for disease and immediately report any 
suspected cases of H5N1. So far the DOI and USDA have tested more than 13,000 birds 
(19). Of these tested, 113 have tested positive for some form of avian influenza. 
However, all were negative for the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus (19). Surveillance has 
been made efficient through regular of tests such as HA/HI, FAT ELISA, RT-PCR, real 
time RT-PCR, in-situ hybridization, and gene sequencing methods, although direct virus 
isolation from fecal samples are still widely used (19). Because poultry contamination 
results in great economic loss to farmers, it is important to have proper incentives 
available for reporting suspected cases of disease to public health agencies. This could 
include discounted vaccinations and/or reward money for communicating with public 
health agencies regarding the condition of poultry. Proper incentives are also necessary 
for encouraging proper disposal of infected carcasses.  
 H5N1 disease control is also being done at regional and national levels.  Along 
with a proper investigation to identify the source of disease, strategies to track the 
movement of poultry and poultry products are also important in identifying the origin in 
the event of an outbreak.  Strict biosecurity practices that prevent exposure to animals or 
other items potentially contaminated with H5N1 are vital for preventing and controlling 
the spread of this virus. To help backyard and smaller poultry producers, the USDA 
developed the Biosecurity for the Birds Program (21). This program provides important 
information about reducing the chances of birds becoming infected with H5N1. Key 
considerations for greater biosecurity are preventing exposure of poultry to wild birds, 
 29 
 
casually introducing new poultry into existing flocks and preventing exposure to 
infectious agents transported by people and/or equipment (20).  
 Vaccination of poultry is a highly effective way to reduce the probability of 
infection. In the event of an H5N1 outbreak in the United States, USDA maintains a bank 
of 40 million bird vaccines. If an outbreak were occur, the vaccines would protect healthy 
birds outside the targeted quarantine areas, preventing spread of the virus. Fortunately the 
vaccine has been shown to reduce avian influenza viral transmission.  According to the 
FAO Avian Influenza Disease Emergency Situation Update, H5N1 pathogenicity is 
gradually rising in endemic areas; however, the disease is being contained in farmed birds 
through vaccination efforts (2). However poultry vaccination does have several 
limitations. Along with implications for cost, there are concerns that vaccination may 
suppress the symptoms of the virus in vaccinated birds that become infected.  This would 
allow the virus to continue spreading into an endemic, which could increase the 
probability of a naturally occurring mutation enabling human transmissibility. Therefore 
clinical and laboratory surveillance are necessary.  
The Public Health Response to an Emerging Pandemic 
Due to the high lethality and virulence of HPAI H5N1, its endemic presence, its 
increasingly large host reservoir, and its ongoing mutational adaptions, the H5N1 virus 
has become the world’s largest pandemic threat. Planning for the control of H5N1 in 
poultry and minimizing the potential of a pandemic influenza in humans is essential. The 
Global Influenza Program within the World Health Organization (WHO) plays a central 
role in monitoring global public health, via ongoing influenza monitoring, virus 
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sampling, and regular flu shots (21). The global health response to H5N1 would ideally 
consist of two systems, a technological system including drugs and vaccines and health 
systems which are responsible for delivery and infrastructure (21). Within these two 
broad systems three public health responses are consistently seen in response to a 
pandemic threat such as H5N1. First is the technological response, which focuses on drug 
and vaccines and their delivery. The WHO has stock piled donated antiviral drugs such as 
oseltamivir for rapid containment purposes, while the U.S. has about two million 
treatment courses of anti-virals in federal and state stockpiles. Vaccination policy is an 
especially controversial topic.  While the regular seasonal influenza vaccine is highly 
recommended by the WHO, not everyone chooses to receive the vaccine. Approximately 
16 manufacturers globally are currently in the advanced stages of producing H5N1 
vaccines through both egg and cell based manufacturing techniques (21). The WHO has 
committed to stockpiling 50 million doses for the event of a global pandemic. However 
with the influenza viruses being variable and prone to antigenic shift and drift it is 
extremely difficult to elicit an efficient strategic vaccination response. It is believed by 
many that the only feasible vaccine solution would involve a global commitment to an 
infrastructure for universal provision of the influenza vaccine (21). Unfortunately, aside 
from the fact that this strategy would require an immense amount of public money, the 
likelihood that seven billion vaccines could be produced, stored and distributed is very 
low (21).  
 Clearly at the present time a solely technological response is not enough. 
Therefore the most efficacious response may be through an educational approach to 
change behavior. In the past the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has been 
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responsible for a variety of communication messages for public education all over the 
world. Their strategy has been largely focused towards preventing animal to human 
transmission. The program voiced standard health issues such as washing hands, cooking 
meat specifically poultry properly, and safe handling of chickens in both work and 
domestic environments (21). Currently UNICEF is involved in pandemic mitigation, 
which involves proper routines for health etiquettes, quarantine and social distancing 
(21). Two studies, independently done in 2007 showed just how effective rapid social 
containment can be. The first study found that in the 1918 pandemic social containment 
measures cut weakly death rates by up to fifty percent (21). In this study, 
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs; i.e., voluntary quarantine, school closure, 
reduced public activities) were proven to decrease virus transmission (30). Seventeen 
U.S. cities, in which multiple interventions were implemented at an early phase of the 
epidemic (6 weeks), showed 50% lower death rates than those cities who engaged in 
limited social containment (30). The second used mathematical models to reproduce the 
pattern of the 1918 pandemic and found that areas that had relaxed their containment 
restrictions after the peak of the pandemic often saw a second re-emergence of infection 
(21). During this pandemic the U.S. engaged in various NPIs, while cities in Europe 
either did not or ended efforts early (31). In the 23 cities, within the U.S. and Europe for 
which data was obtained on timing of interventions, a correlation was found between 
excess mortality and early removal of NPI strategies (31). Therefore the timing of public 
health interventions has great influence on the pattern of the 1918 pandemic.  
 It is essential that these types of behaviors are implemented. In reality a 
pandemic will most likely hit months before a pharmaceutical response can be initiated 
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and these behaviors will have to serve as the front line in pandemic defense. The US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, together with the Departments of 
Commerce, Transport and Health and Human Services published Interim Pre-Pandemic 
Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the 
United States-Early, Targeted, Layered, use of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (21). 
This document involves plans for closing schools, cancelling public gatherings, 
organizing work leave and various telecommunication working strategies. 
 The third public health response is based on the systems within which the 
measures are to be delivered. It is thought by the medical professionals within the WHO 
that a good health system should be structured, ordered, well resourced, state funded, and 
run by doctors (21). However, in the current health setting where hybrid public-private-
traditional systems exist in highly unregulated and poorly resourced setting, and where 
services can be purchased in pharmacies and on the internet, the likelihood of this sort of 
health system evolving is unlikely (21). In order for a system like this to be effective, 
information, prediction, and early warning methods are essential. The WHO has 
generated a series of guidelines to be followed in the event that a human H5N1 infection 
sho uld occur here in the United States. These guidelines consist of confirming the 
diagnosis of recent infection with influenza A (H5N1), reducing morbidity and mortality 
through isolation and treatment, reducing further spread through identification of 
potential human, animal, and/or environmental sources of exposure, determining key 
epidemiological, clinical, and virological characteristics for cases, and lastly exchange of 




V. Pandemic Preparations 
 Challenges for H5N1 Vaccine Development 
Influenza vaccines are possibly the most effective way of mitigating the impact of 
an influenza pandemic by potentially reducing the risk of infection by avian viruses in 
humans during the current interpandemic period. Unfortunately, the H5N1virus presents 
several challenges that must be overcome in order to make an efficient vaccine. Due to 
the high virulence of H5N1 strains, the vaccine manufacturing process must take place 
under higher biosafety conditions then those used during seasonal influenza vaccine 
development.  Currently licensed influenza vaccines are derived by growing viral stocks 
in embroyonated chicken eggs. However, a new avian influenza pandemic will result in a 
lack of embryonated eggs due to virulence in domesticated poultry. Cell culture based 
systems could be used to overcome this challenge if a pandemic did arise.  Vero cells 
have been widely used for human vaccine production over the past 30 years and are the 
only cell line fully accepted by regulatory authorities for production of whole virus 
vaccine (10). However, are Vero cells susceptible to an H5N1 viral infection? 
Fluorescence-activated cell sorting analysis has shown that even though Vero cells 
possess predominately alpha 2, 3 sialic acid receptors, they are fully susceptible to 
infection with influenza A viruses, indicating that linkages other than alpha 2, 6 and 2, 3 
might be involved in the attachment of influenza virus to host cells (34). The madin-
darby canine kidney cells (MDCK) have been previously shown to sustain viral growth 
due to their abundance of alpha 2, 6 sialic acid receptors, and therefore served positive 
control for this study (34). All influenza A virus specific proteins were synthesized in the 
same proportions in Vero cells as in MDCK cells (34). Electron microscopic and 
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immunofluorescence studies showed that infected Vero cells undergo the same 
morphological changes as other polarized epithelia cells (34).  As for the issue of 
biosafety, cell culture vaccine development can be done at BSL-3 standards.  
Much is still unknown about antigenic sites in H5N1 surface proteins and immune 
correlates of protection are inconclusive (5). Typically hemagglutination inhibition (HI) 
assays are used to determine influenza immunity post vaccination. In this assay, serum 
antibodies to the influenza virus will interfere with the virus’s ability to attach to red 
blood cells, therefore inhibiting HA, as seen through inhibition of erythrocyte 
agglutination (5). Agglutinating chicken or turkey erythrocytes are commonly used; 
however, because H5N1 viruses have different receptor specificity than the seasonal 
influenza virus, these cells are not useful to the H5N1 HI assay (5). Horse erythrocytes 
are agglutinated by H5N1 viruses and are therefore a useful substitute (5). The 
neutralization assay is another method used for evaluating serum antibody protection. In 
this assay, serum antibody is evaluated for its ability to inhibit the virus from infecting 
tissue culture cells (5). Both of these assays require live virus and since, H5N1 viruses 
pose a strong biosafety risk, high containment facilities must be used. To counteract the 
need for high containment facilities while performing these assays, noninfectious virus 
particles expressing H5N1 surface molecules and reporter gene are currently being 
developed (5).   
In addition to challenges with vaccine development, H5N1 antigenic diversity 
represents further challenges. H5N1 viruses are divided into ten clades based on 
phylogenic relationships within the HA genes (5). Human infections have resulted from 
clades 0, 1, 2, and 7, with clade 2 causing more infections than any other clades (5). 
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Antigenic heterogeneity exists between clades and has even begun to show within clades; 
clade 2 contains subclade and sub-subclade divisions (5). Although the sequence identity 
between clades is high, there is little cross reactivity in receptor blocking antibodies 
across the various clades and subclades (5). A recent study was able to show that twenty 
residues critical for antigenicity resulted from antigenic profiling of the H5N1 virus. 
Identity patterns across these twenty amino acids were approximately 30%, indicating 
high levels of clade diversity (5). Since it is impossible to predict exactly which clade 
could cause a pandemic, it is important to develop a vaccine that will elicit immunity to 
all or multiple clades.  
The HA of H5N1 is poorly immunogenic and requires higher doses of antigen or 
the use of adjuvants to elicit an effective antibody response (5). In Fact, a vaccine most 
recently approved by The Food and Drug Administration’s Vaccines and Related 
Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) is backed up by the use of an 
adjuvant as will be discussed in the following section. 
 Current Stockpile Vaccines  
On April 17, 2007, FDA licensed the first vaccine in the United States for the 
prevention of H5N1 influenza. This vaccine manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur Inc is 
derived from the A/Vietnam/1203/2004 influenza virus.  As an inactivated monovalent 
influenza virus vaccine, it is for use in people 18 through 64 years of age who are at 
increased risk of exposure to the H5N1 influenza virus subtype contained in the vaccine. 
One multi-center, randomized, double-blinded, placebo-controlled, dose-ranging study in 
healthy adults, 18 to 64 years of age, investigated the safety and immunogenicity of the 
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vaccine (22). A total of 103 healthy adults received a 90 microgram dose of the vaccine 
by injection, followed by another 90 microgram dose, 28 days later (22). The 90 
microgram two-dose regimen produced levels of antibodies expected to reduce the risk of 
getting H5N1 influenza in 45% of those who received it (22). This was concluded based 
on a 4 fold increase of serum antibodies in both HAI and neutralization tests (22). 
In an aim to strengthen the U.S. stockpile for the threat of an H5N1 pandemic, the 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Vaccines and Related Biological Products 
Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) voted that the immunogenicity and safety data on 
Glaxosmithklines’s (GSK’s) H5N1 vaccine were sufficient to support its licensure for use 
in adults (23).  In order to generate a vaccine with antigen sparing potential, the squalene 
adjuvant AS03 was used. The vaccine contains 3.75 micrograms (mcg) of antigen, as 
compared to 90 mcg of antigen that are seen in the previous H5N1 vaccine (24). The fact 
that this vaccine was approved even with its need to be coupled with an adjuvant is 
monumental. No seasonal flu vaccines used within the United States contain adjuvants, 
nor does the existing stockpiled H5N1 vaccine. In fact, ASO3 used in European GSK 
vaccines during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was found to be linked with an increased risk 
of narcolepsy in children of Sweden, Finland, and Ireland (23).  Research regarding the 
safety of adjuvants in vaccines remains inconclusive. However, it seems as though the 
risks are statistically minimal. A study done in Quebec city during the H1N1 pandemic 
showed that vaccination with an inactivated monovalent AS03 adjuvanted vaccine was 
associated with two cases of Guillain- Barre syndrome for every million doses 
administered (32). During the 6-month study period, there were 83 confirmed cases of 
Guillain-Barre syndrome (32). Of those, 25 were related to the receipt of the influenza 
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vaccine 8 weeks prior to onset. After adjusting for age and sex, the risk of developing the 
disease post vaccination was 1.80% (32).  
  Two key trials demonstrated the effectiveness of the GSK vaccine. The first trial 
compared use of the GSK vaccine with or without adjuvant amongst 680 adult volunteers 
(24). The 3.75mcg dose of antigen was sufficient to generate an adequate immune 
response when two doses were used (24). The second trial involving 4,561 adults 
compared GSK with a saline placebo vaccine. In order for the vaccine to be considered 
successful it had to generate an antibody titer of 1:40 (24). Results of the study were a 
success, with 70% of younger adults (18-50) and 60% of older adults (51-65) meeting the 
required FDA standard (24).  The study also showed high seroconversion rates of 90.8% 
and 74.0% after two does in both groups of adults. The GSK vaccine is more 
immunogenic than the H5N1 vaccine already in the nations stockpile, whose 
sersoconversion rate is 45% compared to the 90% seen for the GSK vaccine.  
Options to Improve Pandemic Preparation: What Went Wrong During the 
2009 H1N1 Pandemic? 
 While the 2009 H1N1 pandemic showed that pandemic vaccines could be 
successfully developed and deployed, vaccines became available in significant quantities 
only after the peak of the infection, and only in high income countries. Figure 10 shows 
the extended delay from the onset of the first human case in March of 2009 and the 





Figure 10. H1N1 Response Timeline  
Summary and timeline of the activities during the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic from day 0 when the first case of H1N1 was reported through 8 and 9 
months later when large quantities of the pandemic vaccine became available.  
Adapted from [29] 
With H5N1 potentially resulting in a pandemic there are several factors that can 
be improved upon in order to lessen the negative impact. The first option, prepandemic 
vaccination would undoubtedly improve vaccine efficiency over developing, 
manufacturing, and distributing a vaccine as the pandemic rapidly spreads. While it is 
highly unlikely that   the vaccine would represent a perfect match there is hope that the 
vaccine would elicit a cross reactive immune response.  Policy makers and public health 
officials hope that it would offer at least some protection to people who are essential to 
maintaining security, health care providers, those who provide essential products and 
services, infants, young children and pregnant women (25). During the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, most individuals’ immune systems had been previously exposed via infection 
and/or vaccination with distantly related H1N1 antigens and did not develop severe 
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infections (25). Unfortunately, the mass- majority of the human population has never 
been exposed to an H5 HA, and therefore are more susceptible to the severe disease 
caused by H5N1.  Given that licensed H5N1 vaccines are available in the nation’s 
stockpile, we have the option to vaccinate individuals at greater risk to infection and also 
to expand vaccinations to populations around the globe. It has been suggested that this 
theory backed by investment and public policy could result in a global population being 
vaccinated with a prepandemic vaccine within 3 to 5 years, which could dramatically 
reduce the risk of an H5N1 pandemic (25). 
The second option is generation of a higher quantity of vaccines. There are 
approximately 7 billion people in the world, and the H5N1 vaccine currently requires 2 
doses, meaning that 14 billion vaccines would have to be made available in order for 
global vaccination to occur.  This would undoubtedly be a daunting task, but, as 
mentioned before, possible.  While not every individual is willing or able to receive 
vaccines, the majority of the population could become vaccinated in order to enable herd 
immunity. Since H5N1 could mutate to become highly transmissible amongst a 
population with little preexisting immunity, a large number of people could become 
infected.  Modeling has indicated that the proportion of the population that must be 
immunized in order to generate herd immunity is roughly 80% (25).  Cell culture vaccine 
production allows for faster production of vaccines and is ideal for avian outbreaks where 
egg production is vulnerable. The use of an adjuvant would also reduce the amount of 
antigen needed and increase the production of bulk vaccine. 
The third option to improve pandemic preparation, deals with acceleration of 
vaccine manufacturing during the actual pandemic. Global estimates suggest that, given 
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current manufacturing capacity, only 500 million doses of vaccine would be available 12 
months after a pandemic outbreak.  In 2009 it took three months for the manufacturing of 
an H1N1 vaccine to begin (25). Vaccine manufactures rely on the WHO to identify and 
distribute live reference viruses to create vaccines, which adds weeks to production time. 
Recent studies have shown that this three month time lapse could be reduced to a few 
weeks by early detection and the use of synthetic seed viruses for vaccine production 
(25). This field of study is referred to as synthetic genomics. In this approach genomes 
are designed using the computer and constructed in the laboratory using chemical 
techniques (25). When the genome of a potential influenza vaccine seed virus is 
synthesized and place into a cell, the essential starting material for an influenza vaccine 
can be produced (25).  The ability to synthesize vaccine seed viruses would allow them to 
begin developing pandemic vaccines without waiting for a vaccine virus to arrive from 
the World Health Association Laboratory (25).  
Long Term Pandemic Preparation 
As for long term pandemic preparation, universal vaccine development is the 
Holy Grail approach. By targeting part of the virus that rarely mutates, such as the stem 
region of the HA protein or the NP protein, researchers believe that they can develop a 
vaccine that will provide immunity to various strains of influenza viruses. In contrast to 
the HA head, which is highly mutated, mutations in the HA stem are not as frequent due 
to the essential functions that occur within this region. After the virus is endocytosed, the 
low pH in the endosome induces a complex conformational change in the HA stem (26). 
This conformational change exposes a peptide that mediates fusion of the viral and 
endosomal membranes, enabling the viral genome to gain access to the cytoplasm (26). 
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Therefore, antibodies targeted against the HA stem can block this conformational change 
and membrane fusion, enabling the virus access to the cells replication machinery.  A 
vaccine like this would allow people to be vaccinated as children and then simply receive 
boosters. Research led by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NAID) 
scientist Gary J. Nabel used a two-step immunization approach to elicit infection fighting 
antibodies capable of attacking a diverse array of influenza strains. This two-step 
immunization approach is capable of inducing not only humoral immunity, but also cell 
mediated immunity. The subject is first primed with a DNA vaccine which elicits a cell 
mediated immune response, and then boosted with an inactivated subunit vaccine which 
not only boosts the cell mediated memory response, but also promotes an active humoral 
response. Since the DNA vaccine often encodes a conserved influenza protein, a broad 
cell mediated response is initiated towards a variety of virus strains. The boost with an 
inactivated subunit vaccine creates a specific immune response that will provide 
immunity towards the particular strain of virus used in the vaccine. This is very different 
from current flu vaccines which do not generate such broadly neutralizing antibodies, 
requiring seasonal influenza vaccines to be reformulated annually to match the existing 
virus strains. 
DNA vaccines seem to be the key to future vaccine development. While under 
control by a specific promoter   a plasmid vector expressing a viral protein, in this case 
HA, is injected into the host (33). After uptake of the plasmid, the protein is produced 
endogenously and enters the transporter associated with antigen processing (TAP) 
pathway (33). Through this pathway the proteins enter the lumen of the endoplasmic 
reticulum (ER) via the TAP membrane associated transporters (33). In the ER, peptides 
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bind to MHC class I molecules and then are shuttled to the cell surface (33). The MHC 
class I subclass is recognized by CD8+ cytotoxic T cells (CTL) and stimulates cell 
mediated immunity (33). DNA vaccines also work in the same way as traditional 
vaccines with respect to humoral immunity. In this case the foreign protein is presented 
by the MHC class II pathway via antigen presenting cells (APCs) which elicit CD4+ 
helper T cell responses. CD4+ T cells are able to recognize the peptides formed from 
exogenous proteins that were endocytosed/phagocytosed by APC, then degraded into 
peptide fragments and presented as MCH class II molecules (33). B cells can then be 
stimulated by CD4+ T cells, resulting in antibody production (33). 
 In a set of experiments done in 2010,  Dr. Nabel and his team primed 
monkeys, mice, and ferrets immune systems with a vaccine made from DNA encoding 
the influenza virus HA surface protein (27). In the second “boosting” step the animals 
received a booster dose of the 2006-2007 seasonal influenza vaccine or a vaccine made 
from a weakened adenovirus containing the HA influenza protein (27). The monkeys 
were only boosted with the seasonal influenza vaccine. Though the DNA in the priming 
vaccine was derived from a 1999 circulating influenza strain, all animals made antibodies 
capable of neutralizing virus strains from several other years (27). Mice and ferrets 
produced antibodies not only against strains previous to 1999, including a strain that 
emerged in 1934, but also against strains that emerged in 2006 and 2007. (27). More 
interestingly, even though the prime-boost vaccines were both made from H1 subtypes of 
the influenza A virus, the antibodies they generated neutralized other influenza subtypes, 
including H5N1 (27). This observation indicated that a prime-boost vaccine strategy 
could potentially confer immunity to many or all subtypes of influenza A viruses. In an 
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attempt to see if the prime-boost vaccine could protect from potentially lethal amounts of 
virus the researchers infected mice with high levels of a 1934 flu virus. They saw that 
80% of mice that had received the prime-boost vaccine survived, while   mice receiving 
DNA only, seasonal flu vaccine or a mock prime-boost vaccine all died (27).  The same 
results were also seen in ferrets, which are more comparable to the expected results for 
humans, due to their sialic acid receptor localization.   
The nucleoprotein (NP) of the Influenza A virus is another highly conserved 
protein capable of inducing cross-protective immunity against different influenza A 
viruses. For this reason it is a feasible option for universal vaccine production. The amino 
acid sequence similarity of NP is above 90% within influenza A viruses (28) The NP is a 
conserved internal protein and a good target for eliciting cell mediated immunity.  
Immunologically, NP is the major antigen recognized by cytotoxic T cells (CTL) during a 
viral infection (28). At least 14 human NP peptides have been identified as epitopes of 
CTLs (29). Epitopes in random coil regions are susceptible to mutations and may be 
associated with escape from CTL mediated immunity. Regions that are structurally 
and/or functionally important are useful to vaccine development due to their limited 
mutations. Two epitopes NP 265-274 and NP 174-184 within the RNA binding groove 
have been shown to generate a robust CD4+ T cell response (29).  NP-specific CTLs can 
promote lysis of infected cells by recognizing the NP peptide-MHC complex presented 
by the virus-infected cells. Therefore they are a valuable contributor to the clearance of 
virus from an infected host and an essential component to universal vaccine development. 
In a recent study, the NP protein was used as a target antigen and a DNA prime-intranasal 
protein boost strategy was used to immunize mice (28). The conserved NP protein 
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genome was used to construct the DNA vaccine which was injected for the purpose of 
inducing cell mediated immunity. Twenty eight day later a rNP vaccine was intranasally 
administered to promote a natural humoral immune response.  They were able to show 
that the NP DNA prime-intranasal protein boost was able to induce systemic and local 
mucosal immune responses, which could effectively provide a cross-protection against 
homologous and heterosubtypic influenza virus, due to the conserved  NP DNA priming 
vaccine and the strain specific rNP boost vaccine. 
This prime-boost immunization strategy effectively enhanced the CD8+ T cellular 
immune response induced by DNA preimmunization. Three weeks after the last 
immunization, splenocytes were isolated from mice and stimulated with MHC-I epitope 
peptide from NP in vitro, with the amount of cells secreting IFN-y measured post 
stimulation via ELISpot. (28).  As shown in Figure 11, significant amounts of IFN-γ 
secreting CD8+ T cells were induced by NP DNA vaccination alone, either once or twice 
(28). However, single i.n. administration of rNP alone (Group P1) induced fewer IFN-γ 
secreting CD8+ T cells. An intranasal boost with rNP after once or twice DNA 
vaccinations could effectively increase the number of IFN-γ secreting CD8+ T cells (28). 
 
Figure 11. IFN-y Secreting Splenic CD8+ T cells in Vaccinated Mice 
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Three weeks post immunization the number of IFN-y secreting CD*+T cells 
in the spleen from different groups of mice was evaluated by ELISpot. D1 and D2 
represent NP DNA vaccination alone, either once or twice. P1 represents a single i.n. 
administration of rNP alone. D1P1 and D2P1 represent an intrnasal boost with rNP 
after once or twice DNA vaccinations. 
 Adapted from [28] 
To evaluate the efficacy of the NP DNA prime-intranasal protein boost strategy 
against a lethal dose challenge of heterologous virus, 57 mice were randomized into 3 
groups with 19 mice in each group. Two groups received one or two doses of NP DNA 
vaccine followed by an intranasal boost with rNP at an interval of 2 weeks and the rest 
were unimmunized for control. All mice were i.n. challenged at week 3 after the last 
immunization with 5 × LD50 of A/Chicken/JiangSu/07/2002 (H9N2). As can be seen in 
figure 11 A-B, mice receiving the vaccine displayed significantly less weight loss and an 
increased survival rate over those mice who received a control (28). 
   
Figure 12. NP-DNA Vaccine Protection Against Heterologous Virus 
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Three weeks post vaccination mice were challenged with a lethal dose 
(5xLD50) of influenza A/Chicken/JiangSu/07/2002(H9N2). Survival rate (A) and 
weight loss (B) were then monitored for 21 days. 
Adapted from [28] 
While all of these vaccines need additional development before 
commercialization is possible, it is exciting to think that one vaccine could protect us 
from such a wide variety of influenza strains. It has been estimated that by 2015 the 
universal vaccine approach might be in full affect and diminishing the rate of 250,000 to 
500,000 lives taken annually by this disease.  
VI.  Conclusion 
Collectively, HPAI H5N1 is cause for great concern. With its ability to mutate 
rapidity and spread through various species, the amount of damage that this virus could 
inflict is of disastrous capacity. However the risks that this virus possesses can be 
minimized through combined efforts pertaining to public policy and pandemic 
preparedness. While research with this virus is a risk, the knowledge obtained from doing 
such research is essential in preparing for a pandemic outbreak. In order to lessen the 
possible impact of an H5N1 influenza pandemic, we need more research and further 
development of improved vaccines and antivirals with cross reactivity against multiple 
strains. With proper BSL3 biosafety restrictions and surveillance provided through the 




As far as public health policy, these efforts must be done simultaneously with 
those governing poultry policy at both public and private sectors. It is imperative that 
viral infection be contained and regulated amongst livestock poultry. By not doing so we 
are simply inviting the virus into a human host and giving it permission to adapt to its 
surroundings. This is why policies regarding poultry quarantine, euthanize procedures, 
private farm industries and wild bird migration are so important.  By limiting the 
infection to poultry we are buying ourselves valuable time to research and publicly 
prepare for a future pandemic. Obviously it is not certain that policy regulations will 
prevent a pandemic attack, and with an inadequate H1N1 response in the past, we must 
be prepared for the worst. Pandemic preparedness would require the United States to 
work with other nations to detect human cases of H5N1 and contain any outbreaks. 
Supporting the manufacturing and testing of influenza vaccines, including finding more 
reliable and quicker ways to make large quantities of vaccines, while developing a 
national stockpile of antiviral drugs to help treat and control the spread of disease if an 
outbreak should occur is essential. Also important is working with federal agencies to 
prepare and to encourage communities, businesses, and organizations to plan for 
pandemic influenza. Education and H5N1 awareness are essential to this last point. It is 
not intended to use fear to gain an individual’s understanding of the virus; however 
people need to know that it is a cause for concern. By simply informing the public of the 
basics of the virus, such as mode of transmission, symptoms, and the importance of 
seeking medical attention, public awareness would be achieved.  It is also important to 
educate the population on what procedures should be carried out in the instance that a 
pandemic should arise. This should consist of avoiding public places through acquiring 
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an abundant food and water storage, also having nonprescription drugs and other first aid 
supplies on hand, educating ones children on proper illness etiquette such as washing 
your hands, covering your mouth, and being involved in a community emergency plan.  
Future research should focus on improved vaccines that can confer broad 
protection against multiple viral strains and various influenza subtypes. While extensive 
research has been done with the HA protein, is seems only a few studies have looked at 
the NP as a potential vaccine candidate. It would be beneficial to further investigate the 
NP for its use in DNA vaccines combined with HA protein.  DNA vaccines are highly 
advantageous over traditional live attenuated or killed vaccines. Because proteins do not 
have to be altered to inhibit pathogenesis, the vaccine is able to induce the expression of 
antigens that resemble the original viral epitopes, making the vaccine more efficient. As 
far as vaccine manufacturing, rapid and large scale production can be done at a much 
lower cost than traditional vaccination, which makes them a necessity under pandemic 
conditions. This could be done through the development of a DNA vaccine that encodes 
both the surface HA protein and the internal NP protein from a highly pathogenic H5N1 
strain. It can be assumed that a vaccine of this sort would support both humoral and 
cellular immune responses. This approach has been tested using HA and NA proteins. 
However, since both of these proteins are highly prone to mutations, little cross subtype 
protection was elicited. A combination of surface and internal proteins should be 
effective against the circulating strain and other antigenic variants. The surface HA 
protein expressed from the vaccine would induce a specific H5N1 antibody response, 
while the internal conserved NP protein should not only induce a homologous and 
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heterosubtypic antibody response but also aid in viral clearance through a cell mediated 
immune response.  
The pandemic potential of H5N1 calls for the productions of large quantities of 
vaccine in a short amount of time. While all vaccines mentioned in this paper do provide 
an adequate immune response, there are limitations such as dose size, dose regimes, and 
production efficiency. An interesting approach would be to develop a vaccine that could 
be administered in a single dose. This would cut vaccine production time in half, which is 
essential during a pandemic.  Also patient compliance is more likely to improve, as some 
patients most likely will not receive dose two of the two dose regime. An inactivated 
whole –virus vaccine and adjuvant would be ideal. With whole virus vaccines being more 
immunogenic, using one instead of two injections will shorten the time to develop 
immunity by 4 weeks. As far as dosage, an 8 microgram injection of antigen should be 
sufficient, as that was the total combined dosage used with adjuvant in the GSK vaccine 
(24).  An HI assay using horse erythrocytes could be used as positive indication of 
antibodies towards various strains of H5N1 (5).  A second neutralization assay using 
human respiratory tissues could also be used to determine antibody neutralization (8).  
 Individually, a virus like this could be devastating, however in a collective 
effort between research agencies, government policies and the public itself, we can defeat 
the pandemic threat this virus brings. They key to success in an intrapandemic period is 











1. Morens D.M., K. Subbarao, J.K. Taubenberger. 2012. Engineering H5N1 Avian  
Influenza Viruses to Study Human Adaptation. Nature. 486:335-340 
2. Nabarro, D. 2012. What is bird flu (H5N1)?. Retrieved from http://www.news-
 medical.net/health/What-is-Bird-Flu-(H5N1).aspx 
3. Clancy S.2008. Genetics of the Influenza Virus. Nature Education.1:1 
4. Korteweg C., J. Gu. 2008. Pathology, Molecular Biology, and Pathogenesis of Avian 
Influenza A H5N1 Infection in Humans. J. Pathology. 172:1155-1170 
5. Giles, B. M. 2011. Development of a broadly reactive vaccine for highly pathogenic  
H5N1  influenza. (Doctoral dissertation)Retrieved from http://d-scholarship.pitt. 
edu/6238/1/BMG_Dissertation_FINAL.pdf  
6. Jiao P., G. Tian, Y. Li, G.Deng, Y. Jiang, C. Liu, W. Liu, Z. Bu, Y. Kawaoka, H.  
 Chen.2008. A single-amino-acid substitution in the NS1 protein changes the  
 pathogenicity of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in mice. J.Virology.82:1146-1154 
7. Wy C.N., M.D. Tate, A.G. Brooks, P.C. Reading. 2012. Soluble Host Defense Lectins  
 in Innate Immunity to Influenza Virus. J. Biomed Biotechnology.2012:1-14 
 52 
 
8. Herfst S., E.J. Schrauwen, M. Linster, S. Chutinimitkull, E.D. Witl, V.J. Munster, E.M.  
Sorrell, T.M. Bestebroer, D.F. Burke, D.J. Smith, G.F. Rimmelzwaan, A.D. 
Osterhaus, R.F. Fouchier.2012. Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1  
 Virus Between Ferrets. Science. 336:1534-1541 
9. Masaki I., T. Watanabe, M. Hatta, S.C. Das, M. Ozawa, K.Shinya, G. Zhong, A.  
 Hanson, H. Katsura, S. Wantanbe, C. Li, E. Kawakami, S. Yamada,M. Kiso, Y.  
 Suzuki, E.A. Maher, G. Neumann, and Y. Kawaoka. 2012. Experimental  
 adaptation of an influenza H5 haemagglutinin (HA) confers respiratory droplet  
 transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets.  Nature.486:420-428 
10. Neumann G., J.H. Chen, G.F. Gao, Y. Shu, and Y. Kawakai.2009. Influenza Viruses: 
 Outbreaks and Biological Properties. J. Cell Research.20:51-61 
11. Chen L.M., O. Blixt, J. Stevens, A.S. Lipatov, C.T. Davis, B.E. Collins, N.J. Cox,  
 J.C. Paulson, and R.O. Donis. 2012. In Vitro Evolution of H5N1 Avian Influenza  
 Virus Toward Human-Type Receptor Specificity. J. Virology.422:105-113 
12. Casadevall A., T. Shenk.2012. Containment Level and Case Fatality Mammalian- 
 Transmissible H5N1 Virus Ratio. J. Molecular Biology.3:1-2 
13. Imperiale M.J., and M.G. Hanna. 2012. Biosafety Considerations of Mammalian- 
 Transmissible H5N1 Influenza.  J. Molecular Biology.3:1-3 
 53 
 
14. Sastre A.G.2012.Working Safety with H5N1 Viruses. J. Molecular Biology.3:1-2 
15. Parry, W. 2006. H5n1 debate: How to balance biosafety with research. Retrieved  
 from http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/research-innovations/stories/h5n1-debate- 
 how-to-balance-biosafety-with-research 
16. Tu, M. 2012. Between Publishing and Perishing? H5N1 Research Unleashes  
 Unprecedented Dual-Use Research Controversy. Retrieved from  
‘ http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/between-publishing-and-perishing-h5n1-
 research-unleashes-unprecedented-dual-use-research-controversy/ 
17. Osterholma M.T., N.S. Kelleva.2012. Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1 Influenza:  
 Facts and Perspective. J. Molecular Biology.2:1-4 
18. Casadevall A., T. Shenk.2012. The H5N1 moratorium controversy and debate.J.  
 Molecular Biology.3:1-3 
19. Harless, A. United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Communications.  
 2010. United States prepares for highly pathogenic h5n1 avian influenza in wild  
birds. Retrieved from website:http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb? 
contentid=2006/03/0092.xml&printable=true&contentidonly=true 
20. Beach R.H., C. Poulos, and P.K. Subhrendu.2006. Prevention and Control of Avian  
 Influenza: A View from the Farm Household. J.EnvironmentalHealth.1:1-32  
 54 
 
21. Scoones I.,and  P. Forster.2006. The International Response to Highly Pathogenic  
Avian  Influenza:Science, Policy, and Politics. Economic & Social Reasearch 
Council. 1:1-57 
22.Coucha. R.B., P. Winokurb, R. Bradyc, R. Belshed, W.H. Chene, T.R. Catea, B.  
 Sigurdardottirb, A. Hoeperc, I.L. Grahmd, R. Edelmane, F. Hef, D. Ninoa, J.  
 Capelland, and F.L. Ruben. 2007. Safety and immunogenicity of a high dosage  
 trivalent influenza vaccine among elderly subjects. J. Vaccine. 25:7656-7663 
23. Roos, R. (2012). FDA panel endorses H5N1 vaccine with adjuvant. Retrieved from  
 Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy website:  
 http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/nov1512vrbpac. 
24. Rumkea H.C., J.M. Bayasb, J.R. de Juanesc, C. Casod, J.H. Richardue, M. Campinsf,  
 L. Rombog, X. Duvalh, V. Romanenkoi, T.F. Schwarzi, R.Fassakhovk, F. Abad- 
 Santosl, F.V. Sonnnenburgen, M. Dramen, R. Sangern, and W.R. Balloun. 2008. 
 Safety and reactogenicity profile of an adjuvanted H5N1 pandemic candidate  
 vaccine in adults within a phase III safety trial. J. Vaccine.26:2378-2388 
25. Rappuoli R., and P.R. Dormitzer. 2009. Influenza: Options to Improve Pandemic  
 Preparation. Science. 336:1531-1533 
26. Thomson C.A., Y. Wang, L.M. Jackson, M. Olson, W. Wang, A. Liavonchanka, L.  
 55 
 
 Keleta, V. Silva, S. Diederich, R.B. Jones, J. Gubbay, J. Pasick, M. Petric, F.  
 Jean, V.G. Allen, E.G. Brown, J.M. Rini, and J.W. Schrader. 2012. pdmH1N  
 Vaccination Induces Cross Protective Antibodies. Science. 10:3389-3404 
27. Wei C.J., J.C. Boyington, P.M. McTammey, W.P. Kong, M.B. Pearce, L. Xu, H.  
 Andersen, S. Rao, T.M. Tumpey, Z.Y. Yang, and G.J. Nabel. 2010. Induction of  
 Broadly Neutralizing H1N1 Influenza Antibodies by Vaccination. Science.  
 329:1060-1064 
28. Luo J., D. Zheng, W. Zhang, F. Fang, H. Wang, Y. Sun, Y. Ding, C. Xu, Q. Chen, H.  
 Zhang, D. Huang, B. Sun, and Z. Chen. 2012. Induction of cross-protection  
 against influenza A virus by DNA prime-intranasal protein boost strategy based  
 on nucleoprotein. J.Virology  9:286-293 
29. AK N., H. Zhang, K. Tan, Z. Li, P.K. Chan, S.M. Li, W.Y. Chan, S.W. Au, A.  
 Joachimiak, T. Walz, J.H. Wang, and P.C. Shaw .2008. Structure of the influenza  
 virus A H5N1 nucleoprotein: implications for RNA binding, oligomerization, and  
 vaccine design. The Federation of American Societies for Experimental  
 Biology.10:2638-3647 
30. Hatchett R.J., C.E. Mecher and M. Lipsitch. 2007. Public Health Interventions and  
 56 
 
Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic. Proc Nati Acad Sci.  
 18:7582-7587 
31.Bootsma M.C., N.M. Ferguson. 2007. The Effect of Public Health Measures on the  
 1918 Influenza Pandemic in U.S. Cities. Proc Nati Acad Sci. 18:7588-7593 
32. Pasternak B., H. Svanstrom, D. Molgaard-Nielsen, T.G. Krause, H.D. Emborg, M.  
 Melbye, A. Hviid. 2012. Risk of Adverse Fetal Outcomes Following  
 Administration of a Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Vaccine During  Pregancy.  
 JAMA . 2:165-174  
33. Liu M.A. DNA Vaccines: A Review. 2003. J. Internal Medicine .4:402-410 
34. Govorkova E.A., G. Murti, B. Meignier, C. Taisne, and R.G. Webster. 1996. African  
 Green Monkey Kidney (Vero) Cells Provide an Alternative Host Cell System for  
 Influenza A and B viruses. J.Virology. 8:5519-5524 
35. Taubenberger J.K., A.H. Reid, R.M. Lourens, R. Wang, G. Jin, and T.G. Fanning.  
 2005. Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes. Nature  
 .4060:889-893
 1 
 
 
